Bankruptcy Methods in Transboundary Rivers Allocation Problems Case study : (Atrak river)

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD student, Water Engineering Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad., Mashhad., Iran

2 Associate Professor, Water Engineering Department, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad., Mashhad., Iran

3 PhD Candidate, Department of Water Resource, Faculty of Civil Engineering and Geosciences, Delft University of Technology., Delft., The Netherlands

Abstract

Conflict over shared water resources has been occured in result of mismanagement,bad governance and increasing water demand. Therefore, equitable water allocation is one of the important tools reducing conflict.
In this paper, we investigate application of six methods of bankruptcy theory:Proportional (PRO), Adjusted proportional (AP), Talmud  (TaL), Pinile (Pin), Random arrival (RA), Sequential sharing rules (SSR based on PRO). The area study includesfive regions along Atrak riverin Golestan province. Total available water depending on water requirementsof each region is divided with bankruptcy theory. Since each method has different definition of fairness, so different results can be obtained. According to Plurality Rule, it shows that the results of PRO, AP, RA, Pin theories are the superior ones in this case study. Results of this study can be a starting point for negotiations and making agents’ final decision.

Keywords


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